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Because of an overiding focus on policy and political talk, rather than the underlying social and 
economic phenomena, scholars typically underestimate the importance of underlying 
demographics and labour market dynamics on immigration politics in Europe. Despite rhetoric 
about “fortress Europe” and fears of “floods” to richer nations, flows have generally been demand 
driven, and have therefore been drawn by European nations with the most open and informal 
labour markets – such as Britain, Ireland, Italy and Spain – rather than more highly regulated 
welfare states such as Denmark. They are also more likely to be circular and temporary than one 
way immigration. I discuss the desirability of the apparently inevitable trend in Europe towards a 
more US style international political economy that strongly parallels the migration system 
between the US and Mexico. This effectively has seen the emergence of a dual level governance 
system of immigration, in which “smoke and mirrors” style politics talks about controlled 
policing of borders and migration management, whereas the underlying trends are much less 
controlled and much more porous. I consider four possible scenarios for this “new migration 
system”, before concluding with evidence that suggests that the dominant trend in Europe is 
towards the emergence of a more regionalised system, in which West European societies come to 
rely on East European movers to fill secondary labour market needs in the service economy – in 
an exploitative fashion – as well as encouraging a more effective racial or ethnically-based 




European Union, regional integration, labour migration, Eastern Europe, migration systems, 
migration theory.  
 1THE ENLARGEMENTS of the EU eastwards in May 2004 and January 2007 completed 
a geo-political shift in post-1989 Europe, that – in terms of the migration and mobility of 
populations – poses the biggest demographic change in Europe since the devastation and 
flux at the end of the Second World War. The Cold War was finally over, and Europe 
united again—with new East European citizens able to access now, or in the near future, 
the same free movement rights that have been enjoyed for years by West European 
citizens of the EU. Freedom of movement of persons from the new Member States 
remains a contentious issue, and some borders remain in place: not all temporary 
accession limitations to free movement are yet down. West European states have shown 
themselves to be far less keen on the movement of people westwards than they are on the 
gold rush of western capital East. Yet one by one, formal restrictions on the free 
movement of East Europeans are being given up, in many cases enabling legal 
regularisation of migration and mobility that has long been occuring in practice. Borders 




These dramatic changes represent a new frontier in European migration research. Most of 
the studies completed before the enlargements focused on large scale demographic trends 
or their political framing (Wallace and Stola 2001; Favell and Hansen 2002). Less has 
been done on the micro-, ethnographic level: on the lives, experiences, networks and 
social forms that this new migration in Europe has taken. Fresh research is called for on 
the “human face” of this migration (Smith and Favell 2006), and this is being answered in 
large part by a new generation of East European researchers, themselves often academic 
migrants pursuing education and careers in the West. Favell and Elrick (2008) showcases 
the work of a number of these scholars, based on a conference organised as part of the 
KNOWMIG project (‘Expanding the knowledge base of European labour migration 
                                                  
1 A version of the is paper has been published as Adrian Favell (2008) ‘The new face of East West-
Migration in Europe’, the introduction to a special edition of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34(5) 
‘The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe’, edited by Adrian Favell and Tim Elrick. See also the 
DIIS working paper (2006), ‘After enlargement: Europe’s new migration system’. 
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 2policies’), now based at the University of Edinburgh.
2 In this introduction to the subject, I 
offer a framework and overview for understanding the importance of this new research, 
emphasising two key points. The first is that our tried and tested narrative and models of 
post-war immigration in Europe – the standard discussions of immigration, integration 
and citizenship, based on post-colonial, guest worker and asylum models, and historical 
distinctions between pre- and post-1973 trends – is finished. The second is that the new 
East-West migration finally provides scholars with a European context comparable to the 
Mexican-US scenario that has inspired the largest and most sophisticated body of 
migration theory and research available in the social sciences. East-West migration can 
be read through these theories, providing a rich empirical material that will enable the 
development of better, more comparative views on the driving forces of international 
migration, as well as the role of free movement and migration in regional integration 
processes taking place around the globe today.  
 
Systematising what we can learn from this body of theory and research, I evaluate four 
different hypotheses that might best account for the new East-West migration system in 
Europe. The dominant trend in Europe appears to be towards the emergence of a more 
regionalised system, in which West European societies come to rely on East European 
movers to fill secondary labour market needs in the service economy – in an exploitative 
fashion – as well as encouraging a more effective racial or ethnically-based exclusion of 
migrants from the south or further afield. 
 
 
Political and policy context 
 
Nearly all the policy advocacy on East-West migration, as well as all the credible demo-
graphic and economic scholarship, nowadays suggests that the West has little to fear from 
post-enlargement migration. Early scholarship in the days after the Berlin Wall came 
down – usually by German or Austrian scholars – did suggest that there was a huge pent 
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 3up demand for East-West migration that might provoke a flood to the West (Hönekopp 
1992; Fassmann and Hintermann 1997; Bauer and Zimmerman 1999). Much of this 
research was based on surveys of migration intentions among a population recently freed 
to dream about being part of the West. Later scholars rightly pointed out the unreliability 
of this work. A much better guide to future enlargements were the past enlargements of 
southern and Mediterranean states (Kupiszewski 2002; Wallace 2002). The accession of 
Spain, Portugal and Greece did not lead to floods of new migrants, but manageable flows, 
positive development trends in the new southern Member States, and high levels of return 
migration. The integration of these nations into the European fold in fact stands as an 
unqualified success in the history of the EU—as well as clear inspiration to later 
enlargements. 
 
The consensus today – reflected above all the most influential policy advocacy in 
Brussels (ECAS 2005, 2006; ACA 2006) – is that Europe as a whole is only likely to 
benefit from a greater degree of manageable East-West movement. Not only is Western 
Europe going to receive a new influx of highly educated, talented or (in any case) 
ambitious East Europeans, driven by the very positive selection mechanisms working in 
the European context (Borjas 1999). These migration trends are also quite different from 
the post-colonial, guest worker and asylum immigration that has proven such a long term 
political issue of contention in Europe. East European migrants are in fact regional ‘free 
movers’ not immigrants; and with the borders open, they are much more likely to engage 
in temporary circular and transnational mobility, governed by the ebb and flow of 
economic demand, than by long term permanent immigration and asylum seeking 
(Okolski 2001; Morawska 2002). Many East Europeans in any case were able to move 
and work in the West before 2004; the enlargement would simply regularise a situation 
well established in de facto practice on the ground. 
  
For all the good arguments to encourage open borders and free movement, the political 
calculation on these issues seems to point to a different rationality. There is in fact great 
electoral reward to be had by populist politicians using the ‘threat’ of open doors 
Eastwards as a tool for berating the impact of the EU, in particular the liberalisation of 
 4West European labour markets or employment legislation. The ugly French debate about 
the ‘Polish plumber’ during the EU constitutional vote of spring 2005 was but the most 
visible example of this phenomenon. Little matter that the handful of Polish plumbers in 
France have been outnumbered vastly by their Polish counterparts who chose Britain 
instead, and who now dominate this sector in London or Manchester—or apparently that 
the British economy in the last few years has done much better than the French on the 
back of this informal workforce. It was the failed Bolkestein directive on freedom of 
movement of services that opened the spectre of European nation states no longer being 
able to control employment legislation on their own territory. France baulked at the 
possibility of the rights of workers or the rules of the working week, in certain sectors 
now coming under the jurisdiction of say, Polish or British law, both of which are more 
lax. Critics call this competitive imbalance in the system ‘social dumping’, and ‘a race to 
the bottom’. In reality, though, what is not harmonised (and thereby regulated) by the EU 
with planned legislation, may instead simply get accomplished by the free market, which 
is now able now to freely post workers within Europe wherever and whenever in the 
absence of meaningful border controls. 
 
As regards the members that joined in 2004, West European nations have one by one 
accepted the inevitable and brought down transitional barriers to freedom of movement 
for new Member States. As things stand, the trend seems to be clear after much lobbying 
from the European Commission. Initially only three countries opened their borders: 
Ireland, Sweden, and Britain. All reaped economic benefits from the inflows that 
followed, that have proven higher than expected in the Irish and British case. By 
February 2007, Netherlands had become the ninth country to drop restrictions to the 
EU10 Member States, joining Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg and Denmark have in the meantime reduced barriers. Only Austria 
and Germany – where hostility post 1989 has always been greatest – have confirmed they 
will maintain restrictions until at least 2011. Numbers of such workers are, however, high 
in both these countries, whether legal or not. Recently, on the other hand, Britain led the 
way in announcing that doors were to remain officially shut to Bulgarians and Romanians 
when these two countries joined in January 2007. Spain and then others quickly followed 
 5suit, even though in both cases it will simply mean that large numbers of workers already 
there in the two countries will not be able to regularise their status—or begin to pay 
taxes. 
 
The slow political acceptance of open East-West borders confirms the underlying fact 
that Europe in future has an almost desperate structural need, in both demographic and 
labour force terms, for increased intra-European population movements. For the next 20-
30 years, regardless of what happens to birth rates, this demand will persist; and if more 
countries come to resemble the Italian or Spanish rates of birth, the situation will get 
worse. These demands notably have not been satisfied by the intra-EU movement of 
West Europeans, with regional disparities between the North and South evening out 
through development, structural funds and welfare provision. Intra-EU migration among 
West European countries has only risen slightly over a thirty period since the migration 
stop of the 1970s, despite the extension of freedom of movement rights through 
successive EU treaties (Recchi 2005; Favell 2008). Labour markets instead have looked 
East. European economies – with some variation according to how much they continue to 
preserve nationally specific welfare state provisions and employment legislation – are 
increasingly coming to resemble the USA, in which immigrants fill a vast range of low 
end service sector, manufacturing and agricultural work that nationals no longer accept. 
Who better to fill these 3D (‘dirty, dangerous and dull’) jobs, than fresh faced European 
neighbours from the East, who are likely to be temporary rather than permanent, and are 
ethnically ‘similar’ and/or culturally ‘proximate’? There is a strong suspicion here that 
West European economies might be quite happy to reduce their reliance on non-white, 
non-European immigrants by the development of a more internal and regional European 
labour market. This new migration system in fact might well extend beyond the nominal 
frontiers of the official Member States, to include candidate countries and other near 
neighbors. The European Neighbourhood Policy, although noted normally only for its 
security aspects, is also creating regulated cross-border markets along these lines, in some 
cases to enable new Member States (such as Poland) who are losing their own workforce, 
to replace them with migrant workers from their immediate East (such as Ukrainians). 
The EU thus must be seen as a concentric, territorial project in regional integration, that 
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migration flows, while closing doors to others (Rogers 2000; Favell 2005). 
  
Idealist pro-EU federalists see the economic migration of East European as a win-win-
win scenario. West European economies benefit from dynamic labour market effects, 
East European movers cash in on the premium of working in the higher paid West, and 
East European economies develop through the two way circulation of talent and capital. 
The EU, they think, can successfully govern and manage this scenario if political action 
is pooled at the supra-national level. These rosy scenarios have been celebrated especially 
in the European Year of Mobility of Workers (2006), organised by the Directorate 
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities in Brussels, which has 
lobbied hard for the breaking down of transitional barriers.
3 Neo-liberal economists share 
their optimism, but are much happier to let the whole scenario play out in terms of the 
inter-national ‘competition for the brightest and the best’, where the more powerful 
western economies may indeed benefit disproportionately from the ‘brain drain’ of the 
most employable talent and skills from the East (Borjas 1999). The political rationality in 
the meantime hangs in the balance: national politicians are tempted by populist rhetoric 
towards hostility, while all the economic, demographic, and geo-political arguments point 
in the opposite direction. 
 
 
European research and North American theory 
  
A whole new generation of researchers from East and Central Europe are now 
completing fascinating PhDs in sociology, anthropology and human geography on the 
new East-West migration—many at prestigious West European academic institutions. 
Their careers are themselves the fruit of the EU’s forward looking inclusion of candidate 
Member States in European wide education mobility schemes well in advance of full 
membership. These young scholars, who themselves have lived through the momentous 
                                                  
3 see their website: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/index.cfm 
 
 7changes they are studying, are now documenting the migration systems of Poles, Hungar-
ians, Romanians or Bulgarians in Britain, Ireland, Germany, Spain or Italy. Their efforts 
make the case once again for grounded ethnographic and interviews based research as an 
essential part of the repertoire of international migration studies (see the collection put 
together by Favell and Elrick 2008). 
 
Above all, what they document, as it is happening, is the emergence of  a new European 
migration system. It is perhaps ironic that Douglas Massey and colleagues completed 
their round-up of the post-war European system in a global context at the moment when 
everything was changing again (Massey et al 1999). The standard text book story of post-
war colonial and guest worker immigration driven by industrial growth, followed by 
post-industrial closure and the contested emergence of multi-ethnic nation-states, 
multiculturalism and new conceptions of citizenship (i.e., Castles and Miller 2003; 
Hollifield 1992) now has to be rewritten (on this, see especially King 2002). The 
paradigm of immigration and integration, in particular, becomes redundant in the face of 
the emergent, regional scale, European territorial space. Within this, European citizens – 
old and new – can move freely against a wider, transnational horizon that encourages 
temporary and circular migration trends, and demands no long term settlement or 
naturalisation in the country of work. Post-colonial theories of race, ethnicity and 
multiculturalism – that clutter the shelves of bookstores and the pages of syllabi in the 
Anglo-American dominated field of ‘ethnic and racial studies’ – are also ineffective and 
largely irrelevant in relation to these new movements in Europe.  
 
Rather, to theorise and interpret the new East-West migration in comparative context, 
researchers have turned to the most substantial existing body of theory and research in 
international migration studies, work largely developed in relation to studies of Latin 
American, especially Mexican migration to the US. This is no coincidence: the question 
of East-West integration, and the movement and mobility it encourages, is directly 
parallel to the regional integration processes in North America, that have led Mexican 
migration to the US to be the single largest international migration flow in the Western 
world, and the biggest migration-related component of the US economy, itself the 
 8world’s biggest. Like Europe, the US wrestles continually with the political pressure for 
more effective closure of its southern borders, while – again, like Europe – being 
dependent on the undepletable reservoir of cheaper skilled and unskilled labour it 
provides. It is relation above all characterised by the profound cross-border, territorial, 
regional embeddedness of the US south-west with Mexico, at every level of the economy 
and demography. 
 
The Mexican Migration Project, for example, headed by Jorge Durand and Douglas 
Massey, is the single most ambitious empirical project ever developed on a major 
international migration system.
4 With roots in an ethno-survey methodology, reflected in 
the early anthropological style work on sending communities (Massey, Alarcón et al 
1987), MMP has since 1982 developed and elaborated a huge, publically accessible 
quantitative database, centred on surveys of potential migrant populations in key Mexican 
cities and their patterns of movement to the US. As well as providing the biggest source 
of data about Mexican migration to the US, it has also been the basis for Massey’s 
concerted attempt to summarise, frame and extend migration theory into a more 
comprehensive networks-based migration system approach, that illustrates the 
exponential dynamics and social structures beyond simple push-pull explanations 
(Massey et al 1993). On the back of this research, these core migration theories were 
pushed to encompass the whole globe (Massey et al 1999).  
 
A second body of work, hailing from economic sociology has focused rather on the direct 
impact of these migration flows on the US economy and its internal labour market 
dynamics (Waldinger 2001; Portes 1995). The free flowing, massively informal labour 
market of California for domestic work, agriculture, household and construction work – 
the dynamo that powers this, the largest corner of the US economy – are proving a model 
for the rest of the post-industrial world, as it shifts increasingly into a highly informalised 
and structurally unequal dual labour market model (see Piore 1979). While this is a boon 
for capitalist exploitation of cheap mobile labour, it can also be read as leading to a  
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 9potential globalisation from below, as pointed out in literature on ethnic economies 
(Portes 1998). Domestic work, and the feminization of migration it underlines, is a key 
sector in which these processes play out (Hodagneu-Sotelo 2001)  These theories also 
link in with attempts to show how the emergence of networks and territorial based ethnic 
economic niches are often the primary channel of incorporation of migrant labour into the 
post-industrial economy (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Light and Gold 2000), pointing 
the way forward to future limitations of US urban change in even the most global of cities 
(Light 2006), and to emerging new labour market conflicts with the Latino workforce 
(Milkman 2006). 
 
Rather different in style, but no less influential, has been the body of work grouped 
together under the rubric of ‘transnationalism’. Again, the extraordinary cross-border 
flows, social forms, economic and political structures that have developed among 
Mexicans in the US, particularly in California, have provided the material for a thorough 
rethinking of the nation-state centered immigration/assimilation paradigm, that sees the 
phenomenon only through the receiving country’s eyes (Levitt 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 
1998; Glick Schiller et al 1995). This work has gone on to detail the interpenetration of 
Mexican and US political, economic and cultural dynamics (Smith 2006; Bakker and 
Smith 2003), and changing patterns of Mexican migrant settlement in the US as they 
penetrate ever further the receiving society (Zuniga and Hernández-Léon 2005). 
 
A fourth relevant literature is the work of labour market economics inspired by the 
Mexico-US scenario, notably the distinctive contributions of Chiswick and Borjas. These 
focus on the question of selection mechanisms, and the conditions under which receiving 
societies best capitalise on the potential human capital of immigrants, or even are able to 
select for the ‘unobserved skill’ that is carried by the most motivated and dynamic of 
immigrant (Chiswick 2007; Borjas 1989). Borjas notably argues that the US’s ability to 
select for the ‘brightest and the best’ is declining, as policies have increasingly favoured 
family reunification and migrant networks over demand-driven criteria; he does however 
see great potential for positivity in the European scenario (Borjas 1999).The European 
context in fact has seen the emergence of a much ‘purer’ open borders system, in which 
 10the conditions of an ideal cross-border labour market are better achieved. Here, the 
dilemma is likely to be the threat of ‘brain drain’, and its negative effects on sending 
countries. On the other hand, developments with the American system as regards other 
migrants who have a preferential access to the American economy and American jobs, 
shows that classic brain drain is just as likely under global conditions to lead to positive 
development dynamics (Stark 2004). Free moving entrepreneurs can use their sojourn 
working in the US to develop ideas, networks and sources of capital that will allow 
successful entrepreneurship to be established back in their home country—as has been 





We can systematise the existing literature on East-West migration, as well as what can be 
dreived from the North American migration and immigration literature, by distinguishing 
a number of distinct hypotheses. Migrants to Western Europe from East and Central 
Europe can come from countries that are either, post-accession, full members of the EU 
(subject to transitional barriers on free movement in some countries); or from actual and 
potential candidate countries (who have different external association agreements with 
the EU). They might either be easily and well received, with positive personal 
experiences and observations of life and work in Western Europe, or not. And their 
movement to the West might follow economists’ and geographers’ predictions – leading 
to the emergence of an efficient Europe-wide labour market, and new intra-EU mobility 
regime – or it might have political and economic consequences that reflect or produce 
lead to a rather different exclusionary or exploitative ‘political economy’ of migration in 
Europe.  
 
HYPOTHESIS ONE – NEO LIBERAL EUROPE 
 
In his classic – albeit contentious – economic theory of immigration, George Borjas 
(1989) identifies mechanisms why post-communist immigration to the US was far more 
 11beneficial economically, both to the US and the immigrants themselves, than more recent 
low income immigration from Central America. Both the analogy with communism and 
with Mexico can be drawn for East and Central European migrants, but in Borjas’s terms, 
it is the former situation that ought to prevail. These migrants are relatively well educated 
and/or skilled, but they are moving from countries that have not valued or prized this 
human capital to the degree it will be in the West. Mobility can thus lead to dramatic 
economic payoffs for themselves and their hosts, and they pose few cultural problems of 
adjustment, having accepted the host country’s (capitalist) ideology. In this hypothesis, 
then, East and Central Migrants should be well received, happy and successful, and 
achieve successful mobility. From the receiving side, they are migrants preferable to non-
Europeans because of their ‘cultural’ closeness, their education levels (the costs of which 
were borne in the sending countries), and other political/ideological links – they should 
not, therefore experience negative discrimination or hostility. Being spatially close to 
home, they are unlikely to want to stay or pose long term burdens on the welfare state; 
they are a largely costless migration, with significant benefits for both sides. We should 
expect no big difference between their experiences and the internal movers, or between 
migrants from different status sending countries (this being a ‘market’ governed process); 
and most migrants should offer a strongly positively evaluation of the experience. 
 
HYPOTHESIS TWO – EXCLUSIONARY EUROPE 
 
A rather different reading of this situation suggests an analogy closer to the Mexican or 
Central American one. It also suggests that the regional, cross-border closeness of these 
migrants from the East could in fact pose a serious problem for West European states, 
whose dealings with immigration in the post-war period have generally been based on 
postcolonial models of integrating more distant migrants, who have some close cultural 
and political socialization to the receiving country from global historical and cultural 
links. In this hypothesis, the experiences of the East and Central Europeans will be 
stratified according to perceptions of how willing they are to adapt culturally and 
ethnically to the receiving countries. They will be negative in so far as these migrants are 
seen as a ‘parasitical’ movers – taking the benefits of economic opportunities in the West, 
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cultural assimilation. The situation might vary acording to to what extent the receiving 
country’s immigration paradigm is based on a post-colonial model. Eastern movers may 
even be seen as an economic threat to indigenous working classes and existing ethnic 
minorities in working class positions (an extension of Castles and Kosack 1973). The 
‘new migration’ they represent (Koser and Lutz 1998), is seen as a chaotic threat to the 
post-European migration system, which prior to 1989 was relatively settled and 
politically manageable (Favell 1998). The migrants’ experiences will be largely negative, 
and highly conscious of these reactions among natives. It reflects a systemic response 
mostly governed by national political conceptions of citizenship. 
 
HYPOTHESIS THREE – EU EUROPE 
 
A third hypothesis elicits evidence on the degree to which the new East-West patterns are 
in fact fulfilling the theories and observations of economists and demographers. As well 
as generating kind of win/win scenario envisaged in hypothesis one, the new freedom of 
movement from East to West presages a new European migration system in which East 
Europeans fill European labour market needs, while engaging in temporary and circular 
forms of mobility (Wallace 2002; Williams and Balacz 2002). These will have significant 
development payoffs to the East, and the well governed new system rapidly settles down 
– as EU policy makers expect – into an enlightened and integrated European free 
movement regime (a ‘political economy’) in which all sides are happy. As the model – 
which is very popular amongst EU free movement advocates (see ECAS 2005) – is 
premised on effective political regulation of the market, in this hypothesis we would 
expect to see big differences in the ease of mobility between citizens of countries that 
have acceded and those that have not, as well as between migrants going to countries 
without transitonal barriers and those where they are still up. Migrants’ happiness with 
the movements, as well as their support for the European Union, may well reflect these 
legal and political constraints. 
 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR – EXPLOITATIVE EUROPE 
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The final hypothesis puts a critical spin on the idealised economic scenario, by positing 
that, yes, market integration is occuring, but that it is occuring anyways regardless of the 
EU efforts of governing East-West labour migration through coordinated free movement 
policies. This scenario is suggested as the actual one closest to the reality in Mexican-US 
migration (in the work of Massey et al, 2002), and has been picked up recently in work 
by Favell/Hansen (2002), and Samers (2004). This questions the existence of a well 
controlled ‘fortress Europe’, either before or after enlargement, and points towards the 
exploitative dimensions of the rampant market-led system governing migration in 
Europe. In this hypothesis, political talk of controlling free movement is largely a game 
of electoral ‘smoke and mirrors’, to disguise the degree to which economic interests in 
Europe are now actively exploiting easy East-West migration possibilities, in advance of 
accession and transition barriers coming down. There are few de facto political or legal 
barriers in fact to moving. Migrants from the East find easy ways of entering The West, 
taking up ‘3D’ jobs, in low end service, agriculture and sweat shop manufacturing, 
replacing racially less desirable non-European migrants, but being exploited in advance 
of their rising to meet labour standards and wages of the East (see classic studies of how 
it works in the US, such as Piore 1979; Waldinger 1989). In this scenario,we would 
expect ease of mobility, but seriously negative experiences across the board, a strong 
sense of exploitation and vulnerability, and a sense that ‘official’ EU enlargement is not 
likely to make the situation much better. This downward migration would apply to all 
East and Central European migrants, regardless of educational status or which country 
they come from. 
 
  
The new European migration system 
 
East-West migration is a fruitful context for testing the hypotheses that may be derived 
from current theory and research on international migration and immigration. The 
enlarged Europe in fact offers a rival model of regional integration to the North American 
one. As an institutional construct, the EU can boast of a much more developed corpus of 
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that are rapidly constructing an interpenetrated, regional and international labour market 
– along with its social and cultural consequences – in both parts of the world. European 
Union migration trends, because of this, might be expected to attain a more manageable 
and a rationally organised form than the largely informal and desperately unequal 
relations that characterise the Mexico-US border. As yet little work has been done with 
this broad comparative view of the European migration system. Favell and Hansen 
(2002) make this point, arguing for the primacy of market led forces over political efforts 
at control, and Michael Samers (2003, 2004) has developed a broad political economy 
analysis of Europe’s tacit reliance on undocumented and irregular migration. Franck 
Düvell and Bill Jordan in recent work have both explored the necessary emergence of 
migration networks to facilitate and structure an East-West migration taking place largely 
‘beyond control’ (Jordan and Düvell 2002; Düvell 2005).  
 
New collections such as Favell and Elrick (2008) also offer answers to the hypotheses 
laid out above. With such a wealth of new research on the table, it is to be hoped that 
international migration researchers can begin to look to East-West migration in Europe as 
a potential source for controlling and modifying theories that have hitherto been built 
exclusively on US centred scenarios. Because of EU enlargement, the European 
migration system is probably the most dramatically evolving and changing context of 
migration in the developed world. It offers reason to question the automatic assumption 
that the US is the automatic paradigm of immigration for the rest of the world, while also 
posing the issue of whether Europe is in fact sliding ever closer to the US-Mexico 
migration model. 
 
So in sum, what do these studies add up to? What is the big picture here? Taken together, 
along with other more systematic surveys underway, such as PIONEUR – a major three 
year EU funded network, whose results are now available online – and MIGSYS – a 
cross-Atlantic project funded by the International Metropolis – a much less happy 
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5 Here I will 
close by synthesising the view of the European migration system that might emerge from 
a broader reading of these various studies. Which of the four hypotheses is most 
substantiated? 
 
Both higher and lower end migrants from the East are attracted by the West, and certainly 
see their movements as temporary, opportunistic and circular. In fact there is little 
evidence that formal borders or barriers have made a lot of difference between, say, Poles 
and Romanians, although the latter are more likely to find themselves in precarious 
situations for want of official papers. But where their experiences are strikingly similar is 
in their strong sense of exclusion and exploitation. Many of these migrants accept sharp 
downward mobility in terms of status and qualifications in order to fill some low end 
niche in the labour market, that is grimly justified in terms of its payoff for family back 
home. The jobs they take are the ones that West citizens no longer want – those 3D jobs 
that have become a familiar range of employment ‘opportunities’ in the post-industrial 
service economy. Where there is conflict with the ‘natives’ over jobs and resources, the 
reaction gets expressed in populist and xenophobic terms. Where there is not, they slip 
into the background as an invisible but functional ‘secondary’ part of the economy. In 
Britain today, for example, it is almost impossible to be served dinner or drinks in a rural 
pub or get your bathroom fixed in a big city, without encountering an East European 
worker. Many accept jobs they would have not dreamt of while studying at school back 
home. The attractions of London may offer short term benefits in terms of experience and 
wisdom. But these ambitious ‘new Europeans’ are in danger of becoming a new 
Victorian servant class for a West European aristocracy of creative class professionals 
and university educated working mums.  
 
                                                  
5 I have been a research network partner in both projects. PIONEUR (2003-6) ‘Pioneers of European 
Integration ‘From Below’: Mobility and the Emergence of European Identity Among National and Foreign 
Citizens in the EU’, EU Framework V project, directed by Ettore Recchi, Università di Firenze. See the 
website:  http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur;  MIGSYS (2006-7) ‘Immigrants, policies and migration systems: 
an ethnographic comparative approach’, International Metropolis funded project directed by Anna 




 16Professional and college level East Europeans, meanwhile, attracted West for educational 
opportunities also find themselves blocked in their careers. For them, too, the emergent 
structure is of a discriminatory labour market, that keeps them provisional and precarious, 
in order the better to extract cheaper labour. The payoffs if any are in terms of their status 
in relation to their peer group back home. That might be enough to dampen the feeling 
that they are treated as if they do not belong in the West, or that their hopeful European 
mobility might lead to serious long term consequences in terms of social isolation. The 
sentiment many still express is that West European societies may put on an increasingly 
open economic face, but the reality is that they still believe the USA one day will offer 
far more recognition and reward for their talents and entrepreneurship—if they can get 
there.  
 
For both lower and higher end migrants, then, the hypothetical scenario that best applies 
to the outcome for East-West migration in Europe is hypothesis four – exploitataive 
Europe – even if in their own minds it should resemble more the neo-liberal Europe of 
hypothesis one. The American dream – and its soiled reality – thus, does indeed still lie 
behind so many of the ideas driving the opening of the European economy, for all the 
emphasis placed in Europe on governance and the rational political management of the 
economy. Europeans may well ask whether this is the kind of society they want to see 
built in the name of economic growth and competitivity—the mantra of the Lisbon 
Agenda (2000), that puts mobility and the liberalisation of labour markets at the heart of 
its strategy. In most major cities in the USA today, the faces likely to be flipping burgers, 
cleaning cars, tending gardens, or working as au pairs for young children are Latino; in 
Europe today, these same figures speak with Balkan or Slavic accents. There is perhaps 
one more irony built into to this apparently inevitable asymmetry between East and West, 
and the structural inequalities it reinforces. These new migrants may sometimes face 
hostility, but from the point of view of populist politicians, they are much more desirable 
than other, more visible, actual and potential immigrant populations. It might be 
speculated that, in the long run, West European publics are likely to be more comfortable 
with the scenario of getting used to Balkan and Slavic accents, rather than seeing black 
and brown faces in the same jobs, or (especially) hearing them speak the language of 
 17Allah. There is indeed a racial and ethnic logic inherent in the EU enlargement process: 
borders to the East will be opened as they are increasingly rammed shut to those from the 
South. Perhaps the East can for now provide the population resources to tide Europe over 
in a time of big demographic change. Demography, though, has a sting in the tail. East 
Europeans may well be willing to move on a regional scale well beyond the reluctant 
numbers of West Europeans so tempted. But their birth rates, both under communism and 
after, are a not little different to some of the lowest ones in the West. East-West migration 
is thus unlikely to be a long term solution to the West’s coming demographic crisis. 
 
In an environment in which there are electoral gains to be had from talking tough on 
immigration, it is no surprise that most research on migration focuses on policies of 
immigration control or security. But, just as in the USA, much of this discussion is in fact 
a game of political ‘smoke and mirrors’ (Massey et al 2002), to mask just how little 
control governments or the EU have over migration and mobility trends, let alone the 
globalising international labour market. The underlying political economy of Europe, 
rather, is one that is not closing but opening borders to the East. Debates on immigration 
policy would therefore benefit from paying more attention to the demographic trends and 
labour market dynamics that underwrite the policies that politicians defend. As a first 
stop, they would do well to consider the ethnographic evidence amassed by those 
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